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C H A P T E R
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TAXATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A Delicate Balance
REUVEN S . AVI - Y ON AH AND GIANLUCA MAZZONI

I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of tax law and human rights can be viewed from two opposing perspectives. On
the one hand, the ability of rich residents of developing countries and multinational corporations
operating in those countries to evade or avoid taxation is directly linked to violations of human
rights in those countries, especially from the perspective of social and economic rights like
health and education. Providing such countries with the means to fight back and collect adequate revenues is essential in advancing such rights. On the other hand, some of the techniques
used to achieve adequate revenue collection, like automatic exchange of information (AEoI) and
country-by-country reporting (CbCR), risk violating other human rights like privacy and the
legitimate protection of trade secrets. This chapter seeks to discuss both aspects and the need to
find a reasonable balance between them.
The first part will be dedicated to the compatibility of reporting obligations under the
US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the Organisation for Economic
Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Common Reporting Standard (CRS) with the
EU harmonized framework on privacy and data protection as enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (CFREU), and Directive 95/46/EC. It will be argued that AEoI under FATCA and CRS
go beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the goal of fighting offshore tax evasion. For
example, reporting obligations apply even to persons for whom there is no evidence capable of
suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with tax evasion. In the authors’ opinion, low-risk accounts should be exempted from reporting. The question is how to identify those financial institutions and accounts that present a low risk of being
used to evade taxes in order to exclude them from the scope of reporting obligations. To this
extent, the authors suggest an enhancement of due diligence procedures through the elaboration of a list of subjective and objective “red flag indicators” as provided under the anti–money
Tax, Inequality, and Human Rights. Philip Alston and Nikki Reisch.
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laundering legislation (AML). That list would facilitate not only the detection of those accounts
that present a high risk of tax evasion but also of a reasonable balance between the AEoI and the
right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.
If any legal uncertainty arising from any conflict between the AEoI and the right to respect
for private life and to data protection is not rapidly removed, there is a great risk that large parts
of the edifice erected for AEoI might be struck down by the Court of Justice of the European
Union with the undesirable consequence that national tax authorities will not have, at their
disposal, the necessary measures to provide their residents the above-mentioned social and economic rights of health and education.

II. FATCA, CRS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CROSS-BORDER EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy does not share the same scope of protection between the tax and nontax
context. The notion of privacy in tax law is not as broad as in tort law or in constitutional law.
Taxpayers cannot claim the right to be let alone or be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. The reason is that, at stake, there is also the country’s economic well-being to be
protected. As Justice Roberts argued in Bull v. U.S., taxes are the “lifeblood” of government.1
Therefore, an appropriate balance is required between societal and individual interest.
This tax exceptionalism can be seen in Yeong Yae Yun v. U.S., a case involving cross-border
exchange of information between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Korean taxing
authorities, where it was held that “[p]etitioners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in
their bank accounts.”2 In addition, since the IRS International Examiner also sent copies of the
summons to the Korean taxpayers, the court ruled that all administrative steps necessary for the
issuance of a proper summons were fulfilled.3
Such view has also been shared by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the ECHR has been recently raised in
G.S.B. v. Switzerland, which concerned the transmission to US tax authorities of the applicant’s
bank account details in connection with the mutual assistance agreement signed between
Switzerland and the United States after the UBS scandal.4 The ECtHR held that there has been
no violation of Article 8, since “only his bank account details, that is to say purely financial information, had been disclosed. No private details or data closely linked to his identity, which
would have deserved enhanced protection, had been transmitted.”5 Moreover, the applicant had
benefited from several effective and genuine procedural guarantees against the transfer of his
data to the US tax authorities.
For these reasons, the authors believe that in the context of taxation and, in particular, within
the process of international exchange of information, individuals are only entitled to procedural
safeguards, not a substantive right to privacy. These procedural rights are: (1) the right to be
informed of the information request; (2) the right to participate in the investigations in the
requested state; and (3) the right to challenge the assessment decision in the requesting state.6
The absence of a procedural right (notification, consultation, or intervention) might constitute
an infringement of the substantive right, i.e., the right to privacy.7 In other words, taxpayers will
not be in the position to effectively protect this substantive right without any basic procedural
right.8 The results of a survey conducted by Philip Baker and Pasquale Pistone indicate that only
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22 percent of the countries examined provide a taxpayer the right to be informed before information is sought from third parties in response to a specific request for exchange of information,
and only 17 percent provide a taxpayer the right to be heard by the tax authorities before information related to him is exchanged with another country.9
The importance of procedural safeguards has also been highlighted by two recent judgments
of the ECtHR, e.g., M.N. & Others v. San Marino10 and Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-Nova
v. Portugal.11 The first case concerns the complaint of four Italian nationals about a decision by
the San Marino judicial authorities ordering the seizure of banking documents pertaining to
them and their lack to access to court to challenge that decision. The second case concerns access to the bank accounts of a lawyer charged with tax fraud. Each is discussed in turn.
In the context of criminal proceedings instituted in Italy against several individuals (not
including the applicants) who were charged, inter alia, of a number of offences, the Italian
prosecutors asked the San Marino authorities for assistance. Following that, the San Marino
first-instance tribunal ordered an investigation in respect of all banks, fiduciary institutes, and
trust companies in San Marino. The applicants lodged a complaint before the judge of criminal
appeals against the decision concerning the seizure of banking documents related to them. They
noted the absence of the fumus delicti and of any link between the crimes at issue and their position. In February and June 2011, complaints were declared inadmissible because of the lack of
juridical interest of the appellants.12 The judge of criminal appeals further noted that any breach
of the rights of a person who may only have an eventual interest in the effects of the exequatur
decision had to be raised in the ambit of the Italian jurisdictions.13 The third-instance criminal
judge confirmed the appeal decision.
Based on ECHR Article 6(1), the applicants complained that they did not have effective
access to court to complain about the exequatur decision. They further complained under
Article 8 that the measure had interfered with their private life and correspondence and it
had failed to provide relevant procedural safeguards. Last, they complained that they had
been denied an effective remedy for the purposes of their Article 8 complaint, in breach of
Article 13.
The ECtHR first concluded that the seizure of banking data amounted to interference for the
purposes of Article 8.14 However, the interference was prescribed by law15 and pursued various
legitimate aims, namely, the prevention of crime, etc.16 Therefore, the ECtHR had to determine
whether the measure was necessary in a democratic society and, in particular, whether it was
accompanied by the relevant procedural safeguards.17 In this regard, the ECtHR found that the
applicants did not have the “effective control” to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law
and which would have been capable of restricting the interference in question to what was “necessary in a democratic society.”18 Accordingly, there had been a violation of the right to privacy.
Similar conclusions were reached by the ECtHR in the case of Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-
Nova v. Portugal.19 While inspecting the accounts of Ms. de Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-Nova’s
law firm, the tax authorities noted that she had not remitted value-added tax on professional fees
which had been deposited into her personal bank account. Accordingly, tax authorities asked for
details of that account. She refused on grounds of professional confidentiality and bank secrecy.
Under a domestic law provision, however, the prosecuting authorities may require the
Court of Appeal to authorize the lifting of professional confidentiality and bank secrecy. The
investigating judge requested it here and on January 12, 2010, the Court of Appeal ordered
the lifting on the grounds that the principles of administration of justice and ascertainment of
the material truth should prevail over private interests. Ms. Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-Nova’s
appeal before the Supreme Court was declared inadmissible. Therefore, she complained of a
breach of Articles 6, 8, and 13 of the ECHR.
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The ECtHR held that the consultation of her personal bank statements had constituted an
interference with her right to respect for professional confidentiality, which fell within the scope
of private life. That interference was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim.
However, as argued by Baker,20 it could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society
since the lack of procedural guarantees and effective judicial control meant that there was not a
fair balance between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection
of the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. As observed by the ECtHR, she had not
been involved in the proceedings at any time and had thus been unable to submit her arguments.

B. AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
AND THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION

On the other hand, as discussed by Baker and Pistone, in the case of AEoI, the issues of taxpayer
protection are different. Here, another fundamental right, separate and distinct from the right
to privacy, comes into play: the right to data protection.
The protection of personal data is enshrined in several EU legal sources, including the
treaties establishing the European Union.21 However, the central piece of legislation protecting
the right to data protection is Directive 95/46/EC,22 which will be replaced by a General Data
Protection Regulation.
In particular, according to Article 6(1) of the Directive 95/46/EC, personal data must be: (1)
processed fairly and lawfully (legal basis); (2) collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (purpose limitation); (3) adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and/or further processed (necessity and proportionality); (4) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; (5) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are
further processed (data retention).23
In addition, personal data may be processed only if the data subject has unambiguously
given his consent, which means “any freely given specific and informed indication of his
wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being
processed.”24 Moreover, the data subject has the right of access to their own data and to have the
data rectified, erased, or blocked when the processing does not comply with the provisions of
the Directive, especially because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.25
Additional safeguards are included in Article 11 (right to be informed about the data processing and the transfer of data), Article 23 (right to receive compensation for the damage
suffered as a result of an unlawful processing operation), and Article 25 (“transfer to a third
country of personal data . . . may only take place if . . . the third country in question ensures an
adequate level of protection”26).
Based on the concerns expressed by the Working Party set up under Article 29 of Directive
95/46/EC and on the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
namely, Digital Rights Ireland (Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12)27 and Smaranda Bara
(Case C-201/14),28 neither FATCA nor OECD CRS or DAC2 are fully compliant with the right
to data protection.
In particular, under FATCA, foreign financial institutions (FFIs) are required to report to
the IRS, directly or through their home government, the following information: (1) the name,
address, and Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) of each account holder which is a specified
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US person and, in the case of any account holder which is a US-owned foreign entity, the name,
address, and TIN of each substantial US owner of such entity; (2) the account number; (3) the
account balance; (4) the gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account.29
In a letter of June 21, 2012, the Working Party stated: “. . . FATCA must be mutually recognized
as necessary from an EU perspective. This requires . . . [a]careful assessment of how FATCA’s
goals balance with that of . . . the right to a private and family life, i.e. by demonstrating necessity
by proving that the required data are the minimum necessary in relation to the purpose. A bulk
transfer and the screening of all these data is not the best way to achieve such a goal.”30
Similarly, in a letter of September 18, 2014 on CRS, the Working Party underlined that “it
is necessary to demonstrably prove the necessity of the foreseen processing and that the required
data are the minimum necessary for attaining the stated purpose.”31 It also observed: “The practical roll-out of CRS in Europe based on existing FATCA IT solutions currently lacks adequate
data protection safeguards, notwithstanding the EU proposed to amend the Directive 2011/
16/EU regarding mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. This
Directive—which could be considered as transposition of the US FATCA and CRS in EU law—
so far falls short of data protection safeguards.”32
As a consequence of these concerns, Article 25 of Directive 2011/16/EU was amended in
December 2014 through Article 1(5) of Council Directive 2014/107/EU.33 The original text of
Article 25 became paragraph 1 and three new paragraphs were added:34
2.
3.

4.

Reporting Financial Institutions and the competent authorities of each Member State shall be
considered to be data controllers for the purposes of Directive 95/46/EC.
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, each Member State shall ensure that each Reporting Financial
Institution under its jurisdiction informs each individual Reportable Person concerned that
the information relating to him referred to in Article 8(3a) will be collected and transferred
in accordance with this Directive and shall ensure that the Reporting Financial Institution
provides to that individual all information that he is entitled to under its domestic legislation
implementing Directive 95/46/EC in sufficient time for the individual to exercise his data protection rights and, in any case, before the Reporting Financial Institution concerned reports
the information referred to in Article 8(3a) to the competent authority of its Member State of
residence.
Information processed in accordance with this Directive shall be retained for no longer than
necessary to achieve the purposes of this Directive, and in any case in accordance with each
data controller’s domestic rules on statute of limitations.

As argued by Baker,35 this was a critical change for EU member states since it clarified the
scope of the taxpayer’s right to be informed. Under the new wording, each Reporting Financial
Institution (RFI) is required to inform the taxpayer that information will be collected and
transferred and to do so in sufficient time for the individual to exercise his data-protection
rights (including: the right to be informed of the identity of the controller, the purposes of the
processing, the recipients or categories of recipients of the data; the right of access to data and
the right to have data rectified in case of inaccuracies).
The right to be informed has been recently discussed by the CJEU in Smaranda Bara and
Others.36 The case concerned the transfer of income data between two public bodies, including
the tax administration, of a member state. The CJEU held that the transfer of data from the
national tax authority to the National Health Insurance Fund, without first informing37 the
individuals concerned, was a breach of Article 10, 11, and 13 of the Data Protection Directive.38
According to Baker,39 this clearly has significant ramifications for the systems currently being
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put in place for automatic exchange of financial information in tax matters between reporting
institutions and tax authorities and between tax authorities of different states.
It should be noted that the modification of December 2014 was not exempt from criticism,
especially the new paragraph 4, which refers to the retention of data. According to Maryte
Somare and Viktoria Wöhrer,40 due to the lack of clear deadlines this provision does not substantially enhance data protection and is most certainly not enough to ensure the proportionality of data retention. Indeed, Article 25(4) is formulated in a way which does not allow one
to objectively determine the data-retention period as required by the CJEU in Digital Rights
Ireland41 and the Working Party’s Guidelines.42
However, in the authors’ opinion, the most critical aspect is that all these forms of AEoI
do not request the existence of indicia of unlawful behavior of taxpayers. Borrowing the words
of CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland, AEoI applies even to persons for whom there is no evidence
capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even indirect or remote, with tax
evasion. Thus, AEoI could be considered disproportionate since it fails to narrow down the reporting obligations to individuals suspected of tax evasion. What can be done?
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) in its opinion on the EU-Switzerland
agreement on AEoI argued that:
[T]he Agreement should have included provisions and criteria that explicitly link the reporting
of personal data concerning financial accounts to possible tax evasion and that exempt low-risk
accounts from reporting. In this respect, such criteria should be applicable ex ante to determine
which accounts (and which information) would need to be reported. Only at that stage—once
the relevance (or irrelevance) of the reporting for the purpose of countering tax evasion has been
established—the electronic search might help determining the residence of the account holder.43

In this regard, the authors suggest an enhancement of due diligence procedures through the
elaboration of a list of subjective and objective “red flag indicators” as provided under the AML.
That list would facilitate the detection of those accounts that present a high risk of tax evasion.
Only once the likelihood of tax evasion has been assessed, would FFIs be required to report
those accounts.

III. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING
AND CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY
A. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF COUNTRY-BY-C OUNTRY
REPORTING: A MATTER OF PRIVACY OR COMPETITIVE
DISADVANTAGES?

This second part is dedicated to the interaction between country-by-country reporting (CbCR)
and corporate tax privacy. The first author has argued elsewhere that the question whether the
results of CbCR should be made public has nothing to do with privacy.44
Corporations are legal entities, and the concept of privacy does not apply to them.45 As
argued by Cockfield and MacArthur,46 corporate taxpayer privacy concerns are more concrete
in relation to the tax information of small closely held private corporations. The argument is that
small privately held corporations merely serve as the alter egos of their owners.47 Their business
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matters are inextricably intermingled with the individual shareholder’s personal financial affairs.48 Therefore, revealing the taxes paid by a small, “mom-and-pop” closely held corporation
might be viewed as violating legitimate expectations of privacy by its shareholders.49 But this is
not the case here, since multinational enterprise (MNE) groups with annual consolidated group
revenue less than EUR 750 million will be exempted from the general filing requirement.50

B. THREE (UN)ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON CBCR

Instead, whether or not large multinationals should be required to publish CbCR depends on
the following questions:
1. Does CbCR include information that could reasonably be regarded as confidential,
in that revealing it will lead competitors to discover future business plans (like the
APAs51)?
2. Do these costs overcome the advantage of making CbCR public, which is to increase
pressure on companies to align their reported profits with the location in which they
pay taxes?
3. For US-based multinationals, some of the information included in CbCR is already
public (e.g., profits reported by subsidiaries in tax havens). Would making CbCR public
change significantly the information that is already publicly available?
With regard to the first question, it should be noted that, under the current EU Commission
proposal,52 MNEs will be required to disclose to the public significant financial information, including: (1) the nature of the activities, (2) the number of employees, (3) the total net turnover
made, which includes the turnover made with third parties as well as between companies within
a group, (4) the profit made before tax, (5) the amount of income tax due in the country as a
reason of the profits made in the current year in that country, (6) the amount of tax actually paid
during that year, and (7) the accumulated earnings.53 As has already been argued,54 none of the
financial information mandated by CbCR, in either the maximalist or the minimalist version,
would constitute a trade, business, or other secret as defined by the OECD in the commentary
on the model treaty. In the authors’ opinion, the information that could reasonably constitute a
commercial or trade secret and put the corporation at a competitive disadvantage are included
in the Master55 or Local File.56 For example, MNEs will be required to generally describe in the
master file their overall strategy for development, ownership, and exploitation of intangibles, including location of principal R&D facilities and location of R&D management, as well as important drivers of business profit and important business restructuring transactions, acquisitions,
and divestitures occurring during the fiscal year.57 However, neither the OECD Action 13 report
nor the EU Commission proposal makes such information publicly accessible.58 Nonetheless,
the master file will be available to all relevant tax administrations of the countries where the
MNE had operations, but on a confidential basis.59 Thus, concerns raised over public disclosure
of the data reported in the CbCR template seem to be exaggerated and are based more on fear
than on reality.
With regard to the second question, do the costs outweigh the benefits of making CbCR
public? Evers, Meier, and Spengel argued that CbCR is associated with several direct and implicit costs.60 According to their opinion, direct costs would arise for adjusting the existing financial reporting systems to the requirements of CbCR.61 On the other hand, implicit costs
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of CbCR would primarily stem from disclosing the information to the public.62 Publishing
commercially sensitive information could harm firm competitiveness. Finally, they argued that
CbCR could be potentially associated with the danger of double taxation.63 Tax authorities of
source jurisdictions might use the newly disclosed data to support their own claims towards
MNEs64 or adopt anti-abuse provisions.65
The authors believe that CbCR requirements would not impose any significant additional
burdens on MNEs. As argued by Richard Murphy, attribution of profits to countries already has
to take place for tax purposes and, under existing financial reporting standards, the reporting
of geographically delineated data is already permitted.66 One major company suggested that the
additional costs incurred by MNEs to prepare data for CbCR would be very small.67
In relation to implicit costs, the authors do not believe that public disclosure of CbCR will
harm competitiveness. As noted by the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Responsible
Tax, this argument is unproven.68 In July 2013, Directive 2013/36/EU, the so-called Capital
Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) was adopted. Its Article 89 introduces a new country-by-
country public reporting obligation for banks and investment firms. From January 1, 2015, these
institutions will have to report annually, for each country in which they have an establishment,
data on: (1) name(s), activities, geographical location; (2) turnover; (3) number of employees on
a full-time equivalent basis; (4) profit or loss before tax; (5) tax on profit or loss and; (6) public
subsidies received. It also requires the Commission to conduct a general assessment as regards
potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of country-by-country data,
including the impact on competitiveness, investment, and credit availability and the stability of
the financial system. Therefore, the Commission awarded a study to PwC on the potential positive
and negative consequences of CbCR, including a stakeholder survey and an econometric analysis of the impact of disclosure quality on capital markets outcomes. The majority of respondents
(53 percent) felt that Article 89 would have no impact on the competitiveness of EU institutions.69
In conclusion, as argued by Pomp, opponents of public disclosure have never been able to
illustrate how knowing the amount of tax paid or credit claimed reveals anything of competitive
value.70 Moreover, in those situations, timing is also very important.71
In contrast to these potential costs, someone argued that CbCR might solve the key issue of
general lack of information and, most importantly, have a deterrent effect.72 In particular, in his
comments on OECD Discussion Draft of January 2014, Antony Ting stated: “[I]f a MNE knows
that it will have to disclose the detailed country-by-country information to tax administrations,
it may have less incentive to undertake aggressive BEPS transactions.”73 Proponents of public
disclosure of corporate tax returns have made a similar argument. They argue that disclosure
will promote increased tax compliance, either by discouraging outright evasion or because
companies might become less inclined to take aggressive tax positions such as tax shelters that
are arguably within the rules.74 In this regard, a study by Joel Slemrod, Thor O. Thoresen, and
Erlend E. Bø, found an approximately 3 percent average increase in reported income among
business owners when Norway made its returns searchable online in 2001.75 On the other hand,
Hasegawa et al. argue that in the Japanese case, companies’ taxable income did not decline after
the end of the public disclosure system in 2004.76
CbCR could also be a very effective tool in increasing MNEs’ accountability. Customers
could put pressure on multinationals to increase tax payments in different consumer markets.77
Despite what Evers et al. argued,78 MNEs publicly accused of having engaged in aggressive tax
planning suffer from damage to their reputation.79 This is what happened with the Starbucks
saga in the United Kingdom. Thousands of customers were angry over revelations80 that it has
paid only £8.6 million in tax in fifteen years of trading in the United Kingdom on revenue of
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more than £3.4 billion.81 Starbucks reduced its taxable profit through:82 (1) an intercompany
loan between the US Starbucks business and the UK Starbucks with the interest rate set at a
higher rate than any similar loan; (2) a 4.7 percent payment for intellectual property (which
was 6 percent until recently) that the UK company paid to the Netherlands-based company, and
(3) a 20 percent markup that the Netherlands-based company paid to the Swiss-based company
on its coffee-buying operations. Within a few days of the publication of the parliamentary investigative committee report,83 Starbucks announced that it would voluntarily pay £20 million
in UK corporate tax over 2013 and 2014.84 Finally, as argued by Christiana HJI Panayi, yielding
to international pressure, Amazon changed its business structure so that from May 1, 2015, it
would record sales made to customers in the United Kingdom and some other jurisdictions in
those jurisdictions rather than in Luxembourg.85
With regard to the third and last question, as noted above for US-based multinationals, some
of the information included in CbCR is already public, e.g., profits reported by subsidiaries in tax
havens.86 Citizens for Tax Justice recently stated that the majority of US offshore subsidiary profits
were earned in ten low-tax jurisdictions, namely, Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda, Luxembourg,
Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Bahamas, Singapore, Hong Kong, and British Virgin Islands.87
Using data from World Bank, CTJ estimates that US affiliate corporate profits were 1,884 percent of Bermuda’s GDP and 1,313 percent of Cayman Islands’ GDP in 2012.88 In the same vein, a
study by Keightley and Stupak, based on data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),
estimates that seven tax-preferred jurisdictions (Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Bermuda,
Switzerland, Singapore, and UK Caribbean Islands) accounted for 50.1 percent of all profits
reported as being earned outside the United States, in comparison to the 14.6 percent being reported in the three non-tax-preferred jurisdictions (United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway).89
Interestingly, they argue that there is no connection or, in other words, there is a large discrepancy between the location where US MNEs report profits with that of their physical presence
(where their employees and tangible capital are located).90 This may be an indication of profit
shifting by US MNEs. The authors believe that public CbCR will increase pressure on companies
to align their reported profits with the location in which they are truly and economically active.
Therefore, it is likely that a reduction in the share of profits reported by subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions might occur.

IV. CONCLUSION
Tax law has always been considered somehow deeply different from other areas of law, mainly
because of the public nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority.
This exceptional attitude toward tax has also had unfortunate effects on the applicability of
basic procedural guarantees to tax proceedings, such as the right to be heard before any individual measure which adversely affects a person is taken. “Taxes are the lifeblood of government
and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need,” ruled the Supreme Court in Bull
v. U.S.91 Thus,
the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes
defense, and the burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the pleading, proof, and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force
of such a judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing. The taxpayer
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often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution.92

This exceptional view of tax is also reflected in EoIR and AEoI. States are compelled to restrict taxpayers’ rights to the extent required in order safeguard their important financial interest.
However, in the authors’ opinion, recent judgments of the European Courts have eroded this obligation by striking down those measures that did not provide a proportionate balance between
the legitimate interest of the state and the conflicting rights of individuals. Legal challenges
might arise from the current different versions of AEoI mainly because of the massive and indiscriminate collection of data. Absent any indicia of unlawful behavior, AEoI goes beyond what
is strictly necessary to achieve the goal of fighting against offshore tax evasion.
On the other hand, the second part of this chapter was dedicated to the intersection of
corporate privacy and public disclosure of CbCR. The US Supreme Court made it clear that
corporations cannot claim equality with individuals regarding right to privacy. Therefore,
whether the results of CbCR should be made public has nothing to do with privacy but rather
turns on three (un)answered questions. First, the information disclosed under CbCR does not
appear to be commercially confidential. Second, numerous existing financial reporting systems
are already technically able to provide country-specific data. Third, there will be no negative
impact on the competitiveness of reporting institutions. Therefore, no significant additional
burden would be imposed on MNEs by making CbCR public. Finally, as the first author argued
elsewhere,93 the threat of revealing corporate tax information could be a very effective in curbing
corporate tax shelters and other abusive arrangements designed to eliminate corporate tax. The
mere threat of public disclosure is likely to do more than an audit to keep large corporations
from crossing the line that differentiates between reasonable tax planning and unduly aggressive
tax minimization. That is a line that is hard to define precisely. The potential for public disclosure would help keep corporations on the safe side of that line. Sunshine is, as Justice Brandeis
once said, the best disinfectant.
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